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Mergers and acquisitions within the Australian-real estate investment trusts
(A-REITs) sector have become a noticeable trend in the last decade. Utilising
event study methodology, 36 successful A-REIT mergers and acquisitions
between January 1995 and December 2008 were examined. Both target and
bidding shareholders experience positive excess returns of 4.27% and 0.54%
respectively over the 41 day event window [−20, +20]. Analysis indicates that the
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for bidding firms are considerably greater
than previous research suggests. This study finds higher bidder CARs when scrip
or a combination of scrip and cash is used to finance the acquisition. We also find
that the relative size or the size of the acquirer have a positive and significant
impact on the excess returns of bidding A-REITs. This suggests that the
synergistic benefits from the acquisition are a result of economies of scale and
increased market power. There is also some evidence that the relative size and
method of payment influence the CARs of target firms during the event window.
Keywords: real estate investment trusts (REITs); A-REITs; mergers; acquisitions;
abnormal returns; cumulative abnormal returns
1 Introduction
The Australian real estate investment trust (A-REIT) sector is a significant component
of domestic financial markets accounting for approximately 18% of the total
Australian stock market.1 Over the past decade the A-REIT sector has grown from a
market capitalisation of approximately $10 billion to a peak of $147 billion in October
2007 prior to the global financial crisis. The global financial crisis had a significant
impact on the A-REIT sector with the market capitalisation falling 68.7% to $46
billion in February 2009, since then the A-REIT sector has rallied to over $75 billion
market capitalisation in November 2009.2 Securitised property trusts serve a vital
capital formation function for the real estate market (Allen, Madura & Springer,
2000). The A-REIT sector is a significant component of the global REIT market.
Australia is ranked second behind the US, and makes up 12.2% of the global REIT
market and 49% of the Asia Pacific REIT sector (EPRA, 2009).
A large proportion of the growth in the A-REIT sector can be attributed to an
increase in investment from institutional funds, particularly superannuation funds.
The introduction of compulsory superannuation by the Australian government has
seen a substantial increase in funds under management. The Australian Prudential
*Corresponding author. Email: wd@deakin.edu.au
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Regulatory Authority estimates that the collective worth of Australia’s superannuation
funds is over $1.05 trillion as at December 2008, of which 4% is invested in A-REITs
and 6% in unlisted wholesale real estate funds (APRA, 2009). The A-REIT sector
pays average yields of 6–10% versus 3.6% for the total market (ASX, 2008). The
importance of the A-REIT sector is expected to continue to grow as the retirement
investment industry responds to the demands of an ageing population.
Prior research into A-REITs has identified the importance of the sector for institu-
tional investors. Newell (2008a) highlights the large inflows of capital into A-REITs
from institutional investors, namely superannuation funds. Dimovski (2008, 2009)
further identifies the importance of A-REIT initial public offerings (IPOs) and capital
raisings along with dividend forecasts for both retail and institutional investors, while
Newell and Peng (2006, 2008) highlight the importance of emerging property sectors
both in Australia and the US. Parker (2009) investigated the agency issue of A-REITs
and notes anecdotal evidence suggests that unit price increases may be influenced by
the characterisation of the A-REIT as a property owning trust or a fund manager A-
REIT, while price decreases are influenced by foreign exchange management and the
level of gearing.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the area of mergers and acquisitions in
the A-REIT sector over the period 1995 to 2008. No prior study has evaluated this
facet of the Australian market. Consolidation is one of the few avenues of growth left
for A-REITs.3 Merger activity within the sector has been set in motion by the recog-
nition that size, asset growth and diversification are avenues to improve returns and
attract capital (Moody’s Investors Service, 2006). The acquisition of an A-REIT to
gain its assets has advantages over entering into a direct property transaction. First, it
can be associated with large savings in government taxes such as stamp duty. Second,
the bidding A-REIT can choose to use equity instead of cash to purchase the assets
(Larsen, 2002). Associated with the move to increase size through merger and
acquisitions (M&As), A-REITs have been moving into higher risk areas such as
construction and development, as well as offshore to increase returns (Blundell,
2006). These factors have increased the volatility of the A-REITs income, hence
changing the dynamics of the A-REIT sector.
Newell (2008b) argues that A-REITs are seen as a world-class indirect property
investment vehicle to institutional, international and retail investors. A-REIT shares
have attracted a significant increase in international investors, accounting for over
22% of A-REIT holdings. In recent years, A-REITs have moved to increase their
exposure to international properties. International property accounts for 39% of
A-REIT total assets, with forecasts for this level to increase to over 50% in the near
future. Almost 80% of property acquisitions in 2005 were international properties.
Furthermore, Newell (2008b) also highlights increased international investor interest
in A-REITs from the global property securities fund sector. These international funds
have had an increased significance in the A-REIT investor profile due to the strong
performance of A-REITs and a typical portfolio benchmark weight for A-REITs of
around 13%.4
Recent studies of the US market have found that shareholders of target firms earn
significant positive excess returns around the announcement day, ranging from 9.46%
(Kirchhoff, Schiereck & Mentz, 2006) to 2.16% (McIntosh, Officer & Born, 1989).
However, research on the excess returns to bidding shareholders has demonstrated a
contraction in cumulative abnormal returns. Early studies by Allen and Sirmans
(1987) reported significant positive excess returns of 5.78% around the announcement
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day, while more recent studies have reported significant negative cumulative
abnormal returns of 1.21% (Sahin, 2005). In the current study we measure the extent
to which M&As among A-REITs impact on the returns of shareholders in target and
bidding firms, and find target shareholders earn positive significant excess returns of
4.28% over a three-day event window [−1, +1]. Acquiring shareholders experience
significant positive abnormal returns of 0.86% over the same event window. The
study also considers the extent to which the method of payment influences shareholder
returns. We find that the cumulative abnormal returns for bidding firms are consider-
ably greater and show statistical significance when scrip or a combination of scrip and
cash is used to finance the acquisition. We further find that relative size and the size
of the acquirer have a positive and significant impact on the excess returns of bidding
A-REITs. This is the first REIT study outside the US and will add to the international
literature on REIT M&As.
The paper will proceed as follows: the second section briefly reviews the literature
and identifies the central issues associated with the pattern of shareholder returns
during merger activity within the A-REIT sector. The third section explains the meth-
odology employed, while the fourth section discusses the data and the fifth section
reports the results. The final section makes some concluding remarks.
2 REIT shareholder returns literature
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) identify three major motives for M&As: the
synergy motive, the hubris hypothesis and the agency motive. The synergy motive
suggests takeovers result in the realisation of economic gains with the merging of the
resources of two firms. The hubris hypothesis argues management make mistakes in
evaluating targets and engage in acquisitions even where there is no synergy (Roll,
1986). Finally, the agency motive suggests that takeovers occur because they enhance
the acquirer managements’ welfare at the expense of the acquirer shareholders (Mork,
Schleifer & Vishny, 1990).
Research into the impact of mergers on shareholder returns has shown, that on
average, the majority of gains in mergers are experienced by target firms.5 In 1987,
Allen and Sirmans conducted the first study into the effects of US REIT takeovers.
They investigated 38 successful REIT to REIT mergers from 1977 to 1983 to deter-
mine if the wealth distribution within REIT mergers was the same as for corporate
mergers. Using event study methodology, it was found that REIT bidders experienced
significant positive cumulative abnormal returns of 8.47% in the [−10,0] event
window and 5.78% over the [−1,0] period (Allen & Sirmans, 1987). The abnormal
returns for the acquiring firms post announcement were slightly positive, but not
significant.
McIntosh et al. (1989) examined the returns for 27 target US-REIT shareholders
over the period of 1962 to 1986. Results showed a positive and significant abnormal
return for target shareholders of 2.16% over the event window [−1,0]. The pre-
announcement period [−100,−2] is dominated by positive excess returns, but lacked
statistical significance. Post-announcement abnormal returns over days [+1,+30] were
generally small and insignificant. The authors concluded that results over the three peri-
ods were ‘consistent with the hypothesis that target REIT shareholders experience a
positive wealth effect due to the merger announcement’ (McIntosh et al., 1989, p. 145).
A decade later Campbell, Ghosh and Sirmans (1998) examined 17 completed US
REIT mergers from 1990 to 1998. The investigation of bidder excess returns showed
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a negative cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of 1.5% over the five-day event
window [−2,+2]. The authors suggested this result provided some support for the
‘hubris’ theory. Target REITs produced a CAR of +5.2% over the same window.
Investigating both short- and long-term performance of REIT acquisitions, Sahin
(2005) investigated 35 M&As over the period 1990 to 1998, and found positive and
significant gains to target REITs and significant negative excess returns for bidding
REITs over the short-term event window [−1,+1], 4.31% and −1.21% respectively.
Sahin’s investigation of the long-term performance of acquiring REITs analysed size
benchmark portfolios with buy-and-hold strategies6 over a three-year period starting
two days post-announcement. The results provided some evidence of positive abnor-
mal performance post-acquisition, possibly due to an unexpected decline in the cost
of equity, post-event, resulting in enhanced stock returns (Sahin, 2005).
Kirchhoff et al. (2006) investigated 69 M&A deals of exchange listed real estate
finance institutions between 1995 and 2002. The results indicated positive and signif-
icant cumulative returns to target shareholders of 9.46% over the [−1,+1] event
window. The study found no significant abnormal returns to bidding firms across the
four time intervals. Event windows [−20,+20] and [−1,+1] produced negative CARs
whilst [−10,+10] and [−5,+5] produced positive CARs. The authors concluded that
M&A deals cannot be considered a clear success, but neither can they be considered
to have destroyed value.
Eichholtz and Kok (2008) investigated 95 international7 M&As of property
companies from 1999 to 2004. Utilising standard event study methodology, the study
found excess returns for targets and acquirers were distinctly different for the real
estate sector. Consistent with prior REIT research, target firms experienced a positive
and significant CAR of 8.66% over the event period [−1,+1]. Eichholtz and Kok
(2008) note this lower CAR compared to more general corporate finance studies may
be due to the homogeneity of the assets of property companies, resulting in a lower
potential for synergistic profits. The excess returns to acquirers produced a small, but
positive CAR over the three-day event window. Although the results lacked statistical
significance, they do support previous findings in real estate literature that bidding
firms experience better excess returns in M&As compared with general corporate
finance literature.
A review of the literature has shown that target shareholders enjoy the majority of
the gains in a merger. This is consistent with prior M&A studies across different
industries,. However, the level of excess return for the real estate sector is lower. The
evidence on the impact of acquiring shareholders is somewhat mixed. Early studies
show large excess returns to bidding shareholders, but it appears from later studies that
the opportunity for bidding firms to obtain large excess returns has decreased. Camp-
bell et al. (2001) suggest that an increase in the size of REITs may be a contributing
factor causing acquirer returns to be lower.
3 Methodology
3.1 Event study
Event study methodology as described by Brown and Warner (1985) is used to
measure excess returns to both bidding and target firm shareholders. To implement the
event study methodology the market model method is employed. This method
explicitly accounts for the risk associated with the market and mean returns. The
market model was estimated for each company over a 120-day estimation period
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(t−150, t−30). Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used to determine the param-
eter estimations. The following market model is employed: 
where: 
E(Ri,t ) = The estimated return on security i on day t;
αi = The intercept term;
βi = The slope coefficient;
Rm,t = The observed return for the market index, S&P/ASX200,
8 on day t; and
εi,t = The standard error term.
To avoid the bias associated with the estimation of parameters using daily returns
for securities with infrequent trading (Heggen & Gannon, 2008), we employ the
Scholes and Williams (1977) adjusted beta method.9 The abnormal return (AR) of the
common stock of firm i in the event window is calculated as:10 
The average abnormal return (AARt) on a portfolio of N securities for the event
window is defined as: 
We estimate the CARs for any interval [t1:t2] during the event window T as: 
The event window T is 41 days (T = [−20,+20]), where t = [0] denotes the day the
M&A is announced. To investigate the robustness of our results and to provide
comparison with previous real estate trust M&A literature, analysis of three
additional event periods within the event window: [−1,+1], [−2,+2] and [−5,+5] was
conducted.
To determine the statistical significance of the calculated AR and CAR, a standard
cross-sectional test statistic was estimated. First, we calculate a standardised abnormal
return by dividing each AR in the event window by its estimation period standard
deviation: 
where: 
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The test statistic for the AR on any given day is given by: 
where: Nt is the number of sample securities for time period t.
The test statistic for CAR during the event window is given by: 
where: Lt is the number of abnormal returns that have been accumulated in the event
window.
3.2 Regression analysis
Regression models were developed to examine the abnormal returns calculated above
for both targets and acquirers. Independent variables were selected on the basis of
prior literature along with variables unique to the A-REIT structure. OLS regression
was utilised to test the significance of the relationship between each A-REIT CARs
over the three-day event window [−1,+1] and the explanatory variables discussed
below. 
 
3.3 Firm size and relative bidder size
Acquirer size (SIZE) is measured as the natural log of the market capitalisation of the
bidding A-REIT. Campbell et al. (2001) found significant negative relationship
between bidders’ excess returns and size for REIT mergers and a significant positive
result for target excess returns. The results suggested that larger REIT bidders may
overpay in an acquisition.
Relative bidder size (RELSIZE) is controlled for by dividing the bidder’s equity
market value by the market value of the targets equity. Asquith, Bruner and Mullins
(1983) provided evidence of a significant relationship between relative size and
bidder’s abnormal returns. Later studies have also produced similar results, for exam-
ple Loderer and Martin (1990), Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004), and Kiymaz
and Baker (2008). In the light of prior research we expect the coefficients for both
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SIZE and RELSIZE to display a negative relationship with the CARs for acquiring
A-REITs.
3.4 Degree of financial leverage
The degree of financial leverage is defined as the degree of financial gearing of both the
target A-REIT (TLEV) and bidding A-REIT (BLEV), measured as Financial Debt /
(Financial Debt + Equity).11 Jensen (1986) proposed that firms with higher financial
leverage make better investment decisions due to their lower levels of financial slack or
free-cash flow. Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell (1993) provide evidence to support
this view and conclude ‘that debt improves managerial decision making’ (p. 189). In the
case of REITs, Campbell et al. (2001) found no significant relationship between acquirer
excess returns and leverage. The authors hypothesised that this result was due to the
REIT institutional structure and the restriction it placed on REITs free-cash flow.
Target firms that are highly levered provide bidding firms with the opportunity to
capture synergistic benefits (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Campbell et al. (2001) posit that
highly levered REITs (with low historical growth rates) may find it difficult to reduce
their leverage levels due to the high payout ratios required by law. If merging is a way
to escape this debt-driven entrapment then gains to both parties should be greater. The
study found a positive and significant relationship between excess returns and target
REIT leverage.
3.5 Asset diversification
Allen and Sirmans (1987) argued that REITs that specialised in particular types of
properties or geographical location may have provided bidding trusts with expertise in
identifying mismanaged REITs of similar type. This could result in higher abnormal
returns to acquiring firms when the target is the same type of trust as the acquirer. The
authors divided their sample into related and unrelated mergers (classified by
geographical location and property type) and found statistically significant difference
in the performance of related and unrelated mergers. Related mergers produced a CAR
of 6.63%, as compared with 4.61% for unrelated acquisitions. Specialisation/diversi-
fication (FOCUS) is controlled for by a dummy variable, 1 if the M&A is related 0
otherwise, as measured by property type. Therefore, we expect the FOCUS coefficient
to be positively related to CARs for both targets and bidders.
3.6 Management structure
The management structure of real estate securities can be divided into two categories;
externally managed or internally managed. An externally managed REIT is one that
out-sources the management of the assets to a separate company. In contrast, units in
an internally managed REIT are ‘stapled’ to its management company, which means
that units in the REIT(s) and shares in the company cannot be sold separately. The
REIT entity usually holds the passive property assets while the company is involved
in the non-passive activities, such as property management and development. Greer
and Parker (2005) identify three main motivations for stapled trusts: (1) expansion into
new areas previously restricted to external trusts; (2) alignment of interests between
management and trust unit-holders; and (3) greater financial flexibility in debt funding,
and a lower cost of capital.
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Capozza and Seguin (2000) examined the performance of externally and internally
managed REITs. The results demonstrate that ‘externally managed REITs under-
perform and are priced at a discount relative to their internally managed counterparts’
(p. 92). The authors extended their investigation to identify whether externally
managed REITs have greater risk due to financial or business risk. The results
suggested that externally managed REITs pay interest rates on debt that are
approximately 3% higher than their stapled counterparts.
Management structure (BMGMT) is a dummy variable indicating the management
structure of the acquiring firm; 1 if the firm is internally managed, 0 otherwise. We
hypothesise that internally managed acquirers are expected to enjoy higher excess
returns than externally managed REITs, due to lower agency costs, improved financial
flexibility and a lower cost of capital.
3.7 Method of payment
Research has documented that choice of payment has an impact on excess returns.
Both bidder and target excess returns are higher when cash is used as the method of
payment [for example: Wansley, Lane & Yang (1983), Travlos (1987), Davidson &
Cheng (1997) and Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford (2001)]. There are two hypotheses
for the difference in the observed excess returns between the methods of payment.
First, the different signalling implications of cash versus stock (Myers & Majluf,
1984). Takeovers financed with cash reduce the asymmetric information problem that
is associated with the use of stock or a combination. Second is the tax implication
hypothesis, which suggests that target firm shareholders require a higher payment
from the bidder to compensate them for the immediate tax liability that cash bids
create (Wansley et al., 1983).
In the case of A-REITs we expect this impact to be minimal compared with non-
REIT transactions Their requirement to payout 95% of their earnings, limits the
opportunity to finance acquisitions with internally generated funds, which may lessen
the negative implications of using stock as the method of payment (Campbell et al.,
2001). MOP is a dummy variable for the method of payment; 1 if cash is used to
finance the merger, otherwise 0.
4 Data
Successful A-REIT M&As were identified, along with the announcement day,12 from
the Connect 4 Takeovers Database13 over the period of January 1995 to December
2008. Daily share price data for the identified M&As were obtained from Bloomberg.
Accounting data (leverage, specialisation and management structure) was collected
from the Connect 4 Annual Reports collection and ASX website (www.asx.com.au).
Potential firms were subjected to the following screens before they were included in
the sample: 
● The firm share prices must be listed in Bloomberg for the period beginning 150
trading days prior to the announcement and ending 20 days after the announce-
ment, a total of 171 days.
● There must be an absence of large-scale confounding events occurring within
five trading days of the announcement.
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● Both bidder and target are listed entities and are classified as Australian Real
Estate Investment Trusts.
A total of 3614 transactions were identified that met the above criteria. While the
number of transactions in the sample is small compared to most merger studies in
corporate finance, the sample has the advantage that all events are drawn from the
same industry. This allows the research to focus on the variables of interest without
having to control for the large number of other issues that can affect the results in
studies that include mergers across industries (Campbell et al., 2005).
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the 36 M&A transactions. Panel A
shows the average deal size is just over $500 million, the largest transaction was
almost $1.7 billion. The smallest M&A, by deal size, was approximately $50
million. As we would expect the mean, maximum and minimum deal size values
are all greater than the corresponding values for the target’s market capitalisation,
suggesting that bidders paid a premium for the acquisition. It is interesting to note
the size difference between the targets and bidders. The mean market capitalisation
of the acquiring A-REITs is approximately 3.5 times larger than that of the target
firms. Panel B separates the transaction by method of payment; we can see that A-
REIT bidders used a combination of cash and scrip or scrip as their method of
payment in 22 of the 36 transactions. This outcome is consistent with prior real
estate research that found that the majority of M&A are financed with combination
of cash and scrip or scrip, for example Campbell et al. (2001) and Eichholtz & Kok
(2008), and is most likely due to the legal payout requirements of REITs.
5 Results and discussions
5.1 Event study results
Figure 1 displays the CARs of both target and acquirers’ portfolios. The graph shows
a rise in CARs for both parties on the announcement date. In the days leading up to
the announcement, target firms begin to experience an increase in ARs at around four
days prior to the announcement, acquiring firms’ ARs also display an increase in ARs
at around three days prior. These slight increases suggest the possibility of informa-
tion leakage. Following the announcement, the CARs of the targets remain above the
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for Event Study ($m AUD).
Panel A
Variable Mean Median Max Min Std dev.
Deal size 502.91 331.61 1,689.28 49.89 443.96
Target market cap 493.56 323.66 1,596.96 32.53 465.49
Bidder market cap 1,691.05 1,311.18 7,546.09 52.58 1,676.70
Panel B Cash Combination Scrip Total
Method of payment 14 11 11 36
The descriptive statistics for the 36 A-REIT M&As from 1996–2007. Deal size and market capitalisation
values are reported in $millions. Method of payment values are the number of actual transactions that make
up the sample.
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day 0 level until approximately 10 days after the announcement, after which, the
CARs start to tail off. The CARs for the acquirers, however, continued to exhibit an
increasing trend until day 19 post-announcement.
Table 2 provides the daily average abnormal returns (AAR) over the entire study
period [−20,+20]. Target shareholders experience a significant AAR four days prior
to the announcement, this result suggests the possibility of information leakage. On
the announcement date, targets earn a highly significant excess return of 3.02%. Inter-
estingly, the AAR for targets shows a significant negative return of 0.64% two days
after the announcement. This result may be due to over-reaction to the announcement
by the market on announcement and day +1.
The AAR of bidding firms is positive from two days prior to the announcement
until one day after; however, the announcement day AAR is not significant. Day −1
displays significance, while day +1 displays strong significance. A possible rationale
for this result is that the market is taking some time to digest the information available
regarding the announcement.
To investigate the wealth effects further we examined the CARs over a number of
different event windows ([−20,+20] [−5,+5] [−2,+2] and [−1,+1]). The results are
displayed in Table 3. Panel A displays that target firms, consistent with prior
literature, enjoy the majority of the excess returns. All four event windows show posi-
tive and significant CARs for target shareholders. The CARs over the [−1,+1] window
are broadly in line with those presented by McIntosh et al. (1989) and Sahin (2005)
investigating REITs. They are, however, slightly lower than those presented by Eich-
holtz and Kok (2008) investigating property companies and Kirchhoff et al. (2006)
investigating real estate finance institutions. Although the CARs are positive, the level
of excess return is considerably lower than previous M&A studies in general corporate
finance investigations.15 This result supports the claim made by Eichholtz and Kok
(2008) that the homogeneity of the assets of property companies results in a lower
potential for synergistic benefits.
Figure 1. Cumulative abnormal returns.
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for both target and bidder portfolios for 36 A-REIT
M&A from 1996–2007 over the event window [−20,+20]. The calculation of the CAR is de-
scribed in the text.
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Table 2. Daily average abnormal return for targets and bidders.
Targets Bidders
Day AAR p value AAR p value
−20 0.36% (0.253) 0.19% (0.287)
−19 −0.15% (0.536) −0.09% (0.819)
−18 0.24% (0.309) −0.14% (0.520)
−17 0.26% (0.594) −0.24% (0.448)
−16 −0.52% (0.084)* −0.07% (0.815)
−15 0.01% (0.797) 0.02% (0.473)
−14 −0.20% (0.306) −0.09% (0.367)
−13 0.08% (0.730) −0.39% (0.046)**
−12 0.21% (0.702) 0.14% (0.312)
−11 −0.08% (0.504) 0.10% (0.988)
−10 0.37% (0.173) −0.11% (0.624)
−9 −0.29% (0.147) −0.28% (0.059)*
−8 −0.22% (0.620) −0.01% (0.830)
−7 −0.44% (0.124) 0.30% (0.103)
−6 0.25% (0.360) 0.11% (0.459)
−5 0.21% (0.775) −0.08% (0.843)
−4 0.65% (0.022)** −0.03% (0.901)
−3 0.11% (0.431) −0.12% (0.761)
−2 0.03% (0.750) 0.33% (0.368)
−1 0.79% (0.015)** 0.27% (0.076)*
0 3.02% (0.000)*** 0.20% (0.267)
1 0.47% (0.018)** 0.38% (0.027)**
2 −0.64% (0.009)*** −0.20% (0.367)
3 0.46% (0.401) −0.38% (0.036)**
4 0.18% (0.604) 0.19% (0.702)
5 −0.40% (0.116) 0.30% (0.199)
6 0.46% (0.094)* 0.23% (0.503)
7 −0.13% (0.731) 0.14% (0.831)
8 0.17% (0.638) −0.27% (0.227)
9 0.02% (0.947) 0.67% (0.003)***
10 −0.20% (0.424) 0.03% (0.627)
11 −0.32% (0.118) 0.22% (0.565)
12 0.23% (0.467) 0.12% (0.985)
13 −0.23% (0.453) −0.17% (0.916)
14 0.17% (0.809) −0.39% (0.024)**
15 −0.28% (0.335) 0.15% (0.357)
16 −0.15% (0.629) 0.39% (0.141)
17 0.11% (0.843) −0.01% (0.829)
18 −0.29% (0.409) 0.03% (0.657)
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The CAR results for bidding firms shows positive and significant returns over
event windows [−2,+2] and [−1,+1]. Prior research findings on acquiring REITs has
been mixed, Sahin (2005) showed bidding firms experienced significant and negative
CARs of 1.21% over the three day event window [−1,+1]. Kirchhoff et al. (2005) and
Campbell et al. (1998) both observed negative CARs around the announcement
period, but neither displayed statistical significance. Eichholtz and Kok (2008) found
bidding REITs experience positive CARs of 0.37% over days [−1,+1], however the
result was not significant. Campbell et al. (2005) found acquirer CARs for public-
private REIT M&As enjoyed significant positive excess returns of 1.52% over days
[−1,+1]. Finally, Allen and Sirmans (1987) showed bidding REITs experienced
positive and significant CARs of 5.78% over the event window [−1,0]. Our results
may be driven by the recognition that size, asset growth and diversification are
avenues to improve returns and attract capital (Moody’s Investors Service, 2006).
To test if there is any structural difference in the excess returns of A-REITs, we
divided the sample into two sub-periods, 1995 to 2001 and 2002 to 2008 (Panels B
and C respectively). Dimovski (2010) notes that the Managed Investments Act 1998
allowed for the introduction of a single Responsible Entity role post June 2000. This
act meant that A-REITs were no longer required to engage both a Manager and a
Trustee. The ‘removal of the trustee safeguard was an important institutional event’
(Dimovski, 2010, p. 4) and hence warrants investigation into the excess returns both
prior to the event and post-event.
Results show that bidders enjoy higher excess returns in the sub-period 2002–2008
compared with both the overall study period and sub-period one. Excess returns
during the three-day event period is 1.56% and highly significant in sub-period two
compared with 0.24% in sub-period one. This result suggests that the removal of the
trustee safeguard may have improved bidder CARs in an A-REIT M&A. Target CARs
remain positive across all event windows in both sub-periods; however the signifi-
cance of the CARs over the 41-day event window have decreased, with sub-period
two displaying no significance.
The results for bidding A-REITs provide further support for the synergy motive.
These synergistic benefits may be the result of improved management of the targets’
assets following the announcement (Allen & Sirmans, 1987) or the result of econo-
mies of scale. Seth (1990) suggests acquisitions of targets of significant size relative
to the bidder have the potential for creating synergy via economies of scope, size and
increased market power. The possible cause of these synergies will be investigated in
the regression analysis. The results also show a difference in CARs for acquirers post
the introduction of the single Responsible Entity role.
Table 2. (Continued).
Targets Bidders
Day AAR p value AAR p value
19 −0.07% (0.793) −0.35% (0.027)**
20 0.03% (0.860) −0.54% (0.005)***
CAR 4.27% 0.54%
The average abnormal return (AAR) over the 41-day event period around acquisition announcement and
the cumulative abnormal return (CAR). Day 0 represents the date of announcement. The calculation of
AAR is described above. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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To further investigate the wealth effects of the study, we divided the sample via
method of payment. Table 4 displays the CARs of both targets and acquirers when
either cash is used to finance the transaction or scrip/combination. As discussed previ-
ously, results of studies investigating the relationship between method of payment and
ARs have shown that both bidder and target CARs are higher when the M&A is
financed with cash. Panel A shows that targets enjoy significant and positive CARs
over three of the four event windows when cash is used. When comparing the CARs
for cash to scrip/combination in panel B we can see that target shareholders earn
slightly higher CARs in cash financed M&As. This result supports the Campbell et al.
(2001) proposal that the limitation of internally generated funds due to the organisa-
tional structure of REITs may lessen the negative implications of using stock as the
method of payment. Interestingly, the CARs for targets in panel B are significant
across all event windows.
Contrary to prior research, we find that acquirers earn higher CARs when scrip or
a combination is used to finance an acquisition. The CARs are positive across all event
windows in panel B and highly significant in event windows [−2,+2] and [−1,+1].
Bidding shareholders earn a total excess return of 1.55% in the three day period when
scrip/combination is used as the method of payment. The CARs to bidders when cash
is used are all non-significant and range from negative 0.88% in the [−20,+20] period
to positive 0.38% over the [−5,+5] window.
Table 3. Cumulative abnormal returns.
Panel A 1995–2008
No. of obs 36 Targets Bidders
Event window CAR p value CAR p value
[−20,+20] 4.27% (0.035)** 0.54% (0.916)
[−5,+5] 4.88% (0.000)*** 0.86% (0.158)
[−2,+2] 3.67% (0.000)*** 0.99% (0.023)**
[−1,+1] 4.28% (0.000)*** 0.86% (0.003)***
Panel B 1995–2001
No. of obs 19
[−20,+20] 4.77% (0.097)* −0.36% (0.448)
[−5,+5] 4.36% (0.001)*** 1.09% (0.424)
[−2,+2] 2.69% (0.002)*** 0.72% (0.444)
[−1,+1] 4.13% (0.000)*** 0.24% (0.635)
Panel C 2002–2008
No. of obs 19
[−20,+20] 3.63% (0.193) 1.54% (0.511)
[−5,+5] 5.54% (0.000)*** 0.61% (0.226)
[−2,+2] 4.94% (0.000)*** 1.29% (0.012)**
[−1,+1] 4.47% (0.000)*** 1.56% (0.000)***
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the four event windows. Panel A shows results for full study
period, Panel B shows results for sub-period 1995–2001 and Panel C shows results for sub-period 2001–
2008. Day 0 represents the date of announcement. The calculation of CAR is described above. ***, **, *
show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 5 displays the CARs of both parties when the scrip/combination sample was
separated into combination and scrip only financed mergers to further identify what
method of payment was driving the results from panel B of Table 4. Results show that
target shareholders benefit more from mergers financed with a combination of cash
and scrip than those financed with 100% scrip. The excess returns are significant
across the three shorter study windows.
Acquiring CARs are considerably higher when scrip is used and display higher
statistical significance. The CARs over event window [−2,+2] for bidders is 2.08% for
scrip and 0.85% for combination, the [−1,+1] window returns CARs of 1.79% and
1.31% respectively. The signalling properties for bidding firms may be driving this
result; more specifically, acquiring shareholders identify the synergetic benefits of the
merger but value the fact that the bidding firm is able to preserve cash by using scrip
to finance the merger. A-REITs are required to payout 95% of their earnings in order
to receive tax transparency, hence, the opportunity to use scrip as their method of
payment in a M&A may suggest a more efficient use of scarce resources, in this case,
cash. Furthermore, the high level of transparency within the sector may reduce the
asymmetric information between A-REITs and shareholders resulting in the market
being able to price A-REITs more accurately and therefore reducing the signalling
properties seen in more general corporate finance studies. It is only with investigation
into the long term impacts, post merger, that the performance of bidding A-REITs that
utilise scrip payments for mergers will be more fully understood; an area for further
research.
Our results show support for the synergy motive, both target and bidding share-
holders experience positive excess returns of 4.27% and 0.54% respectively. The
Table 4. Method of payment CARs.
Panel A: cash
No. of obs 14 Targets Bidders
Event window CAR p value CAR p value
[−20,+20] 4.72% (0.256) −0.88% (0.371)
[−5,+5] 5.86% (0.001)*** 0.38% (0.843)
[−2,+2] 3.63% (0.001)*** 0.25% (0.898)
[−1,+1] 5.01% (0.000)*** −0.22% (0.923)
Panel B: scrip/combination
No. of obs 22 Targets Bidders
Event window CAR p value CAR p value
[−20,+20] 4.04% (0.075)* 1.45% (0.396)
[−5,+5] 4.36% (0.000)*** 1.18% (0.099)*
[−2,+2] 3.70% (0.000)*** 1.46% (0.005)***
[−1,+1] 3.90% (0.000)*** 1.55% (0.000)***
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the four event windows when the sample is divided into
method of payment. Cash is when the M&A is financed by cash; scrip/combination is when the M&A is
financed with scrip only or a combination of scrip and cash. Day 0 represents the date of announcement.
The calculation of CAR is described above. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level respectively.
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CARs around the announcement period are also highly significant for both parties.
The driver for this synergistic benefit is investigated below. Our most interesting
result is the method of payment. Prior research has shown that when cash is used to
finance an acquisition, both targets and bidders experience greater excess returns due
to either the signalling implications (Myers & Majluf, 1984) or the tax implication
hypothesis (Wansley et al., 1983). However, our results show that the CARs for
bidding firms are considerably greater and show statistical significance when scrip/
combination is used to finance the acquisition. Further investigation showed that scrip
financed acquisitions produced significant excess returns for bidding A-REITs across
three of the four event windows ([−5,+5] [−2,+2] [−1,+1]), an outcome that warrants
further research.
5.2 Regression results
Ordinary least squares regression is employed to test the significance of the relation-
ship between both targets and acquirers excess returns and the independent variables
described previously. The three-day CARs [−1,+1] are regressed against the explana-
tory variables; size, relative size, both acquirer and target leverage, focus, the
acquirer’s management structure and the method of payment. Standard diagnostic
tests are also run to examine for normality, hetroskedasticity and omitted variables.
Descriptive statistics regarding the dependent and independent variables are provided
in Table 6.
Table 7 displays results including all the dependant variables. Panel A examines
the results for bidders and shows relative size is positive and slightly significant for
Table 5. CARs for scrip and combination payments.
Panel A: scrip
No. of obs 11 Targets Bidders
Event window CAR p value CAR p value
[−20,+20] 2.21% (0.373) 2.30% (0.322)
[−5,+5] 3.30% (0.013)** 2.54% (0.026)**
[−2,+2] 2.62% (0.001)*** 2.08% (0.007)***
[−1,+1] 3.73% (0.000)*** 1.79% (0.001)***
Panel B: combination
No. of obs 11 Targets Bidders
Event window CAR p value CAR p value
[−20,+20] 6.05% (0.101) 0.60% (0.834)
[−5,+5] 5.53% (0.000)*** −0.19% (0.919)
[−2,+2] 4.89% (0.000)*** 0.85% (0.208)
[−1,+1] 4.08% (0.000)*** 1.31% (0.026)**
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the four event windows when the sample is divided into scrip
or combination for method of payment. Scrip is when the M&A is financed 100% by scrip. Combination is
when the M&A is financed with a combination of scrip and cash. Day 0 represents the date of
announcement. The calculation of CAR is described above. ***, **, * show statistical significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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acquiring A-REITs, more specifically, the smaller the market value of the target REIT,
relative to the acquirer, the higher the excess returns for the acquirer. This result is in
contrast with prior ‘general’ M&A studies, for example Asquith et al. (1983), Moeller
et al. (2004) and Kiymaz and Baker (2008). However, our result is consistent with
prior REIT research by Campbell et al. (2001) who found that relative size is positive
and significant for acquiring REITs. The method of payment variable is negative and
highly significant; this result supports our findings from the event study analysis,
where acquiring firms CARs were greater when scrip was used to finance the acqui-
sition compared with cash payments. Finally, the degree of financial leverage for the
acquiring A-REIT is positive and significant. This result supports claims made by
Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) that firms with less free-cash flow are less likely to
misuse resources on value destroying acquisitions.
Panel B displays the results of the regression model for target A-REITs. The target
leverage variable is significant and negative when outliers are included, this result
suggests that target A-REITs with lower levels of debt in their capital structure enjoy
higher excess returns in a merger. This outcome is in contrast with Myers and Majluf
(1984) and Campbell et al. (2001). However, there is one outlier observation: the CAR
of the observation was more than three standard deviations away from the mean CAR.
When the outlier is removed from the sample, target leverage is no longer significant.
The method of payment coefficient is negative and significant for target A-REITs
when outliers are removed, suggesting that target shareholders also benefit when scrip
or combination is used to finance the acquisition. In both regressions (including and
excluding outliers) the relative size variable is significant at the 5% level and is nega-
tive. This result suggests that target A-REIT shareholders enjoy higher excess returns
when the acquirer is much larger relative to them.
In regression analysis a number of the explanatory variables may exhibit high
levels of correlation, this can have an impact on their explanatory power. The size
variable in both models is not significant. However, prior real estate research has
Table 6. Descriptive statistics for regression model.
Variable Mean Median Max Min Std dev.
Target CAR [−1,+1] 4.07% 2.99% 20.02% −7.13% 5.28%
Bidder CAR [−1,+1] 0.86% 0.87% 6.78% −4.47% 2.53%
SIZE 20.542 20.749 22.744 14.518 1.512
RELSIZE 0.977 1.145 3.581 −6.373 1.639
BLEV 0.190 0.202 0.379 0.000 0.084
TLEV 0.193 0.213 0.354 0.000 0.101
FOCUS 0.528 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.506
BMGMT 0.361 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.487
MOP 0.389 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.494
The descriptive statistics for the three-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of target and bidding
A-REITs for 36 mergers from 1996–2007 and the explanatory variables. SIZE is the natural log of the
market value of the acquiring firm, RELSIZE is the natural log of the ratio of the acquirers size divided by
the target size, BLEV is the acquirer’s degree of financial leverage, TLEV is the target’s degree of financial
leverage, FOCUS is a measure of specialisation/diversification measured by property type, dummy variable
1 if it’s a related M&A, BMGMT is a dummy variable indicating the management structure of the acquiring
firm, 1 if the firm is internally managed, 0 otherwise, and MOP is a dummy variable for the method of
payment, 1 if cash is used to finance the merger, otherwise 0.
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shown that the size of the acquiring firm has an impact on excess returns. Campbell
et al. (2001) identified a significant negative impact of acquirer CARs and a
significant, positive impact on target CARs. Table 8 displays the correlation matrix of
the independent variables. It can be seen that there is a high level of correlation
between size and relative size (0.800). Due to this correlation we conducted additional
OLS regressions by removing size and then relative size. The results of these new
regression models are reported in Table 9.
Investigation of Table 9 shows that when size is removed from the regression
model (model 1), relative size becomes highly significant and the coefficient is posi-
tive. The level of the acquirer’s financial leverage remains positive and significant.
Method of payment maintains its negative coefficient and remains highly significant.
Model 2 shows that when relative size is removed from the model, size becomes
highly significant and positive. This result is in contrast to Campbell et al. (2001), who
showed that size is negatively related to excess returns for acquiring REITs. However,
Eichholtz and Kok (2008) note that large firms have improved efficiencies and
resources that may increase the likelihood of acquiring other firms. As a result, our
findings may suggest that larger A-REITs have economies of size advantage in the
Australian sector. The method of payment variable remains negative and significant.
However, the bidders leverage is no longer displaying any significance. Model 3
shows consistent results for target A-REITs as those displayed in Table 7 when size
is removed. Interestingly, when relative size is removed (model 4), size displays no
statistical significance. Only the degree of financial leverage for target firms is
significant at the 5% level and negative.
Using the CARs estimated from the event study analysis, we tested the extent to
which excess returns of A-REITs is conditioned on size, financial leverage, manage-
ment structure, the degree of specialisation and method of payment. The method of
payment coefficient is negative and significant for both targets and bidders. This result
supports the finding in the event study analysis that acquiring firms enjoy higher
excess returns when scrip or a combination of scrip and cash is used to finance the
acquisition. As discussed earlier, this result is in contrast with the majority of prior
real estate and more general M&A research. We find that the size and the relative size
Table 8. Correlation coefficient matrix of independent variables.
BLEV BMGMT FOCUS MOP RELSIZE SIZE TLEV
BLEV 1.000
BMGMT 0.345 1.000
FOCUS 0.491 0.132 1.000
MOP −0.325 −0.125 −0.273 1.000
RELSIZE −0.576 −0.112 −0.238 0.473 1.000
SIZE −0.401 −0.027 −0.128 0.223 0.800 1.000
TLEV 0.283 0.315 0.087 0.178 −0.085 −0.124 1.000
The correlation coefficient matrix of independent variables for 36 mergers from 1996–2007. SIZE is the
natural log of the market value of the acquiring firm, RELSIZE is the natural log of the ratio of the acquirers
size divided by the target size, BLEV is the acquirer’s degree of financial leverage, TLEV is the target’s
degree of financial leverage, FOCUS is a measure of specialisation/diversification measured by property
type, dummy variable 1 if it’s a related M&A, BMGMT is a dummy variable indicating the management
structure of the acquiring firm, 1 if the firm is internally managed, 0 otherwise, and MOP is a dummy
variable for the method of payment, 1 if cash is used to finance the merger, otherwise 0.
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of the bidding A-REIT has an important influence on the CARs. This suggests that the
synergistic gains from the acquisition are not due to the improved management of the
targets assets or acquiring firms with similar property types (both BMGMT and
FOCUS were insignificant across all models). It does suggest that the synergy motive
for the acquisition is a result of economies of scale and increased market power.
Finally, Eichholtz and Kok (2008) note that large firms have improved efficiencies
and resources that may increase the likelihood of acquiring other firms.
6 Conclusion
This paper has examined the impact of M&A announcements on A-REIT shareholder
returns between January 1995 and December 2008. It is the first paper to examine
REIT M&As outside the US. Utilising event study methodology, we studied 36
successful A-REIT M&As. Consistent with prior US studies, our results show that
target A-REITs enjoy the majority of the excess gains. Furthermore, our results indi-
cate support for the synergy motive, both target and bidding shareholders experience
positive excess returns of 4.27% and 0.54% respectively. The CARs around the
announcement period are also highly significant for both parties. The lower CARs for
targets support the suggestion by Eichholtz and Kok (2008) that the homogeneity of
the assets of property companies results in reduced potential for synergistic benefits.
The excess returns to acquirers support claims that size is an important consideration
for A-REITs.
The most interesting result is the method of payment. Prior research has shown
that when cash is used to finance an acquisition, both targets and bidders experience
greater excess returns. However, our results indicate that the CARs for bidding firms
are considerably greater and show statistical significance when scrip/combination is
used to finance the acquisition. Further investigation showed that scrip financed
acquisitions produced significant excess returns for bidding A-REITs across three of
the four event windows ([−5,+5] [−2,+2] [−1,+1]), an outcome that warrants further
research. A possible explanation for this result is due to the legal payout requirements
of A-REITs. The use of scrip as the method of payment may suggest a more efficient
use of scarce resources: in this case, cash. Furthermore, the high level of transparency
within the sector may reduce the asymmetric information between A-REITs and
shareholders resulting in the market being able to price A-REITs more accurately and
therefore reducing the signalling properties seen in more general corporate finance
studies.
The final section of our analysis investigated the characteristics of A-REITs which
may be driving the CAR observed in our event study analysis. Using the estimated
CARs, we tested how the excess returns of A-REITs is conditioned on size, financial
leverage, management structure, the degree of specialisation and method of payment.
The method of payment variable is negative and highly significant for acquiring
A-REITs. This result supports our findings from the event study analysis, where
acquiring firms’ CARs were greater when scrip was used to finance the acquisition
when compared with cash payments. Finally, our results showed that relative size and
the size of the acquirer have a positive and significant impact on the excess returns of
bidding A-REITs. This result suggests that the synergistic benefits of the acquisition
are a result of economies of size and increased market power.
Given the recent increase in international investors in the A-REIT sector and the
continued growth of including international properties in A-REIT portfolio holdings,
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this paper provides key insights into the investment strategies for both Australian and
international institutional investors when considering the impact of M&As within the
sector. Furthermore, given the impacts of the global financial crisis, with the A-REIT
sector trading at a discount to Net Tangible Assets (NTA) for the first time since
200216, this may pave the way for another wave of M&As in the future as the A-REIT
sector recovers (Klijn 2009).
Notes on contributors
Chris Ratcliffe worked in the finance industry for 10 years as a foreign exchange trader before
entering academia. Chris is currently completing his PhD in the area of Real Estate Investment
Trusts at Deakin University.
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Notes
1. Source: Authors computation from S&P/ASX200 A-REIT index as proportion of S&P/
ASX200 index as at November, 2009.
2. For extensive discussion on the impact of the global financial crisis and A-REITs see Doble
(2009).
3. Australia is the most highly securitised property market in the world, with nearly 60% of
the underlying properties securitised (Bartholomeusz, 2005).
4. Compared with US (37%), UK (8%), Hong Kong (12%) and Japan (13%) benchmark allo-
cations by property security funds (Newell, 2008b).
5. See: Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Servaes (1991).
6. Sahin (2005) also investigated cumulative average and mean calendar AR along with the
Fama–French three factor model, however, neither model detected significant AR.
7. Countries included: USA, Canada, UK, Australia, Sweden and the Netherlands.
8. S&P/ASX200 is the investable benchmark for the Australian equity market. The index is
comprised of the top 200 stocks listed on the Australian Stock Exchange.
9. See Scholes and Williams (1977) for full discussion on adjusted beta methodology.
10. Returns include dividend payment and other corporate actions.
11. Financial debt includes both long- and short-term debt.
12. To confirm announcement date, each transaction was cross referenced with ASX
Announcements database. If an announcement occurred after the close of trade, the follow-
ing trading day was employed as day 0.
13. Connect 4 is a well regarded private company provider of Australian Stock Exchange
(ASX) information to universities, government departments, banks, stockbrokers and other
such finance researchers.
14. We investigated all M&A trades during the 1995–2008 period, no M&A transactions
occurred in 1995 and 2008.
15. See Jensen and Ruback (1983), Andrade, et al, (2001), and Kiymaz and Baker (2008).
16. Median half-year discount to NTA of 41% (BDO, 2009).
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